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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
James H. Wenke appeals from the judgment entered after a jury found Wenke guilty
of possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver.

Wenke asserts a number of

evidentiary errors; multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct that, in his view, rose to
the level of fundamental error; and cumulative error.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On October 15, 2017, James H. Wenke left his brother’s marijuana farm in Oregon
with Jennifer Hickman, his girlfriend, and Colbie Witte, Hickman’s roommate. (Tr., p.317,
Ls.6-20, p.318, Ls.7-11, p.318, L.25 – p.321, L.8. 1) Wenke had a black draw-string bag
with an Oregon Ducks logo on it. (Tr., p.320, Ls.17-24; see State’s Ex. 1.) The bag
appeared to be “about half full.” (Tr., p.321, Ls.21-25.) Wenke, Hickman, and Witte drove
to Hickman’s home in Payette, Idaho. (Tr., p.321, Ls.6-17.)
When they arrived at Hickman’s home, Hickman could smell marijuana. (Tr.,
p.323, Ls.8-11.) She walked inside and caught her son “smoking a blunt.” (Tr., p.323,
Ls.13-18.) Hickman made her son get rid of the blunt, and then went to her bedroom to
change. (Tr., p.323, Ls.19-23.)
About five minutes later, Hickman came out of the bedroom to an odor of marijuana
so strong that it immediately gave Hickman a headache. (Tr., p.324, Ls.3-24.) It was a
much stronger odor than she previously smelled when she caught her son smoking a blunt.
(Tr., p.324, L.25 – p.325, L.5.) Hickman went into the kitchen and saw Wenke take a
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Unless otherwise indicated, transcript citations refer to the transcript of the trial that took
place on January 23-24, 2018.
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cookie sheet of marijuana out of the oven. (Tr., p.325, Ls.6-15.) When Hickman asked
Wenke what he was doing, Wenke responded that “he was drying [the marijuana] in the
oven.” (Tr., p.325, Ls.16-18.) Wenke took the marijuana into the back bedroom. (Tr.,
p.326, Ls.1-5.)
At about that same time, Officer Mattson with the Payette City Police Department
knocked on Hickman’s door. (Tr., p.179, L.23 – p.180, L.3, p.186, L.22 – p.188, L.7,
p.326, Ls.6-23.) He and some other officers had come to check for a reported stolen
motorcycle and to perform a welfare check after hearing reports “of children in the
residence being exposed to and offered illegal substances to consume.” (Tr., p.185, Ls.312.) He had smelled marijuana at the front gate of the property, and the odor’s strength
increased as he had approached the house. (Tr., p.187, L.5 – p.188, L.4.) “[T]he smell
was much stronger than that of a simple joint . . . it definitely smelled like a hot, burning
type of marijuana.” (Tr., p.194, Ls.9-17.)
Hickman opened the door. (Tr., p.188, Ls.8-9.) She allowed the officers to run the
VIN number on a motorcycle on her property, and the motorcycle did not come back as
stolen. (Tr., p.189, Ls.6-22.) Officer Mattson asked who all was in the residence. (Tr.,
p.189, Ls.23-25.) Hickman told him that her five children and Witte were inside but did
not tell him that Wenke was inside. (Tr., p.190, Ls.1-6.) Officer Mattson asked everyone
to come out of the house. (Tr., p.327, Ls.7-9.) He asked Witte whether anybody else was
in the house as she was leaving, and “she eventually divulged that Mr. Wenke . . . was in
the back of the residence still.” (Tr., p.190, Ls.7-17.) Upon Officer Mattson’s request,
Witte retrieved Wenke. (Tr., p.190, L.18 – p.191, L.7.) Officer Mattson saw Wenke come
out of the back bedroom. (Tr., p.191, Ls.2-7.)
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Hickman gave Officer Mattson and his colleagues permission to search her
residence. (Tr., p.194, Ls.18-20.) The officers found “a green, flaky substance that looked
to be marijuana on her table.” (Tr., p.194, L.21 – p.195, L.4.) They also found a few buds
of marijuana in a zippered pouch in the living room. (Tr., p.195, Ls.18-24.)
After finding the marijuana in Hickman’s kitchen and living room, the officers
decided to secure a search warrant before continuing the search. (Tr., p.196, Ls.5-14.) The
officers “secured the premises” and “made sure there was no other occupants of the house.”
(Tr., p.196, Ls.15-24.) Wenke, Hickman, and Witte were initially detained outside. (Tr.,
p.196, L.25 – p.197, L.3, p.333, Ls.1-6.) Hickman asked Wenke what he had done with
the marijuana. (Tr., p.333, Ls.10-12.) Wenke responded that he put it in the back bedroom
in the closet in a white bucket. (Tr., p.333, Ls.13-20.) Because of the cold weather, the
officers moved the adults to the jail while awaiting the search warrant. (Tr., p.333, Ls.16, p.334, L.17 – p.335, L.1.)
A judge signed a search warrant for Hickman’s house and the vehicles parked at
the house. (Tr., p.198, Ls.8-12.) In searching the house, the officers found in a closet in
the back bedroom a white plastic bucket that contained a large amount of marijuana. (Tr.,
p.208, Ls.12-24.) Officer Mattson subsequently weighed the marijuana and determined it
weighed 6.61 ounces. (Tr., p.226, Ls.3-5.) In searching Hickman’s car, the officers found
a black draw-string Oregon Ducks bag with a green leafy residue throughout the inside.
(Tr., p.203, Ls.1-19, p.206, Ls.18-23; see
- State’s Ex. 1.) The search of the house also
produced a number of other items, including electronic scales. (Tr., p.208, Ls.12-24.) The
state charged Wenke with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and
included an enhancement for being a persistent violator. (R., pp.47, 78.)

3

Prior to trial, the prosecutor notified Wenke that he planned on using a two-and-ahalf-minute video from Officer Mattson’s bodycam showing a conversation between
Wenke and Officer Mattson that occurred at the jail shortly after the execution of the search
warrant. (1/22/2018 Tr., p.35, Ls.22-25.) In the video, Officer Mattson tells Wenke that
he is going to be charged with trafficking in marijuana based on the marijuana residue in
the black draw-string bag with “Oregon State or something on it” and the marijuana found
in the bucket, which Officer Mattson describes as “over a pound.” (State’s Ex. 8 at 0:230:44.) Wenke incredulously responds, “Over a pound? Shut the fu--” and is visibly upset.
(State’s Ex. 8 at 0:44-55.) Officer Mattson then tells Wenke his Miranda 2 rights. (State’s
Ex. 8 at 1:08-1:18.) He then asks Wenke whether he brought the marijuana over from his
brother’s marijuana farm, and Wenke says he did not. (State’s Ex. 8 at 1:19-1:28.) Wenke
then says, “I would also like to make this a statement of record, that until you motherfuckers
told me to fucking come out I wasn’t even in that fucking house at that time.” (State’s Ex.
8 at 1:30-1:42.) Officer Mattson tells Wenke that there was an officer outside in the back
of the house and Wenke was not back there. (State’s Ex. 8 at 1:43-46.) Wenke responds,
“Yeah right, fucking, ask me about my fucking weights.” (State’s Ex. 8 at 1:46-1:48.)
When Officer Mattson points out there were weights in the bedroom where the marijuana
was found, Wenke says, “No. Are my weights in there? No, you fucking retard.” (State’s
Ex. 8 at 1:49-1:56.) After a little more back-and-forth, Wenke says, “You know what’s
funny? Tell me something, stupid. Okay? Tell me one thing you dumb son of a bitch.
Where’d you find that black bag?” (State’s Ex. 8 at 2:18-2:26.) Officer Mattson then shuts
off his body camera. (State’s Ex. 8 at 2:26.)

2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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At the pretrial conference, Wenke’s counsel objected to the prosecutor playing any
part of the video except for the very end where Wenke references the black bag. (1/22/2018
Tr., p.36, L.21 – p.37, L.7.) He argued that “part of the video is Mr. Wenke getting upset
with Mattson regarding him being arrested and goes off essentially swearing at him” and
“that if that’s introduced, that’s doing nothing but essentially showing that Mr. Wenke is a
bad guy, convict him.” (1/22/2018 Tr., p.37, Ls.1-10.) He asked that the prosecutor
“further redact that video.” (1/22/2018 Tr., p.37, Ls.10-12.)
The prosecutor explained that he wanted to show the video for more than just
Wenke’s question regarding the black bag at the end. (1/22/2018 Tr., p.37, L.13 – p.40,
L.14.) Specifically, the prosecutor explained that the entire video was relevant because (1)
Wenke’s incredulous response to the weight of the marijuana implied Wenke knew the
approximate weight of the marijuana, (2) Wenke’s statement that he was not in the house
when the police arrived was contradicted by other eye-witnesses, which implied Wenke
lied to distance himself from the marijuana, (3) Wenke’s denial that his weights were in
the bedroom where the marijuana was found was contradicted by the evidence, which again
implied Wenke was trying to distance himself from the marijuana, and (4) Wenke’s
question regarding the black bag implied that Wenke knew where the bag had been located.
(1/22/2018 Tr., p.37, L.13 – p.40, L.14.) The prosecutor also observed that editing out all
of the profanity would alter the context of the video. (1/22/2018 Tr., p.40, Ls.2-14.) The
district court told the parties that it would make a decision after watching the video.
(1/22/2018 Tr., p.40, Ls.15-19.)
The following day, the district court notified the parties that it had the opportunity
to review the video. (Tr., p.148, Ls.24-25.) The district court informed Wenke’s counsel
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that it understood his position regarding the profanities but would admit the video: “I find
that it’s relevant, and I don’t find that it is unfairly prejudicial, so I will allow the State to
use that CD.” (Tr., p.149, Ls.2-4.)
Also prior to trial, the prosecutor provided notice of his intent to use I.R.E. 404(b)
evidence. (R., pp.89-98; 1/22/2018 Tr., p.12, L.24 – p.20, L.7.) The prosecutor informed
Wenke and the district court that he wanted to use (1) testimony from Hickman that she
had driven Wenke to deliver marijuana on two past occasions, (2) testimony from Hickman
that she had seen Wenke weighing marijuana in the past, (3) testimony from Witte that on
five separate occasions she saw Wenke give marijuana to Hickman’s children, (4)
testimony from Witte that she overheard phone conversations in which Wenke agreed to
sell marijuana, and (5) Wenke’s past conviction for bringing marijuana from Oregon to
Idaho. (1/22/2018 Tr., p.12, L.24 – p.20, L.7.) Wenke’s counsel objected to all of the
I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. (1/22/2018 Tr., p.21, L.7 – p.24, L.9.)
The district court excluded Wenke’s past conviction but reserved judgment as to
Hickman’s and Witte’s testimony until it could hear—outside the presence of the jury—
what the witnesses were going to say. (Tr., p.8, L.7 – p.10, L.20.) After hearing from
Hickman, the district court excluded Hickman’s testimony that Wenke had actually
distributed marijuana in the past on the basis that the prosecutor did not present “sufficient
evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact.” (Tr., p.312, L.8 – p.313, L.20.)
Specifically, the district court did not “find her testimony to be credible regarding any prior
incidents of delivery or distribution” because her testimony on that issue contradicted
Witte’s testimony and contradicted her own testimony from the preliminary hearing. (Tr.,
p.312, L.8 – p.313, L.1.) But the district court found admissible Hickman’s testimony “that

6

she has seen him with marijuana, she has seen him divide that marijuana up before.” 3 (Tr.,
p.313, Ls.2-5.)
At the end of the trial, the jury found Wenke guilty of possession of a controlled
substance with the intent to distribute. (R., p.144.) Pursuant to the persistent violator
statute, the jury also found that Wenke had three felony convictions. (R., p.143.) The
district court imposed a sentence of twenty years fixed and twenty years indeterminate.
(R., p.208.)
Wenke timely appealed. (R., pp.218-19.)

3

After hearing from Witte, the district court excluded her testimony regarding Wenke
giving marijuana to Hickman’s children because “the prejudice is way too much in terms
of relevance” but allowed her testimony regarding phone calls she overheard of Wenke
purportedly selling marijuana. (Tr., p.287, L.17 – p.288, L.19.) On appeal, Wenke has not
challenged the district court’s ruling as to Witte. (See generally Appellant’s brief.)
7

ISSUES
Wenke states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted State’s Exhibit
8, the bodycam video from Officer Mattson, without redaction, because the
district court did not conduct the proper balancing test, the video was
misleading and irrelevant, and the video’s limited probative value was
substantially outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed Ms. Hickman to
testify that she had previously seen Mr. Wenke divide up and weigh
marijuana because the district court’s finding that there was sufficient
evidence to establish that alleged prior act as fact was clearly erroneous?

III.

Did the State violate Mr. Wenke’s right to a fair trial by committing
prosecutorial misconduct amounting to fundamental error?

IV.

Even if the above errors are individually harmless, was Mr. Wenke’s
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law violated because the
accumulation of errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial?

(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
I.

Has Wenke failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it
admitted Officer Mattson’s bodycam video of his interview with Wenke?

II.

Has Wenke failed to show that the district court clearly erred when it found
sufficient evidence to establish that Wenke divided up and weighed marijuana
in the past?

III.

Has Wenke failed to show that the prosecutor committed misconduct rising to
the level of fundamental error during his closing argument?

IV.

Has Wenke failed to show that the cumulative error doctrine applies?

8

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Admitting The Bodycam Video
A.

Introduction
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Officer Mattson’s

bodycam video of his interview with Wenke. The district court acted consistently with
Rule 403 when it admitted the video only after determining that “it’s relevant” and that “it
is [not] unfairly prejudicial.” (Tr., p.149, Ls.2-4.) Although Wenke argued in the district
court that the video was unfairly prejudicial because Wenke used profanities throughout
the video, he has abandoned, and thus waived, that argument on appeal.
His new appellate arguments as to how the video, in his view, is irrelevant and
unfairly prejudicial are not properly before this Court because Wenke did not make those
arguments in the district court. They are also meritless. First, the portion of the video in
which Officer Mattson incorrectly tells Wenke that the marijuana weighed “over a pound”
is relevant because Wenke’s incredulous response as to the weight of the marijuana implies
that Wenke knew the actual weight of the marijuana. Second, that portion of the video is
not misleading because Officer Mattson made clear in his testimony that the marijuana did
not actually weigh more than a pound and that he used “over a pound” in his interview with
Wenke based on his estimate of the weight from holding the marijuana. Third, the visual
of Wenke in the jail was not unfairly prejudicial because the jury heard, without objection,
that Wenke and the other adults had only been taken to the jail so they could wait
somewhere warmer than outside of the house while police executed the search warrant.

9

B.

Standard Of Review
“‘The district court’s ruling that the probative value of the evidence was not

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice may be overturned only for an
abuse of discretion.’” State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 781, 419 P.3d 1042, 1079 (2018)
(quoting State v. Labelle, 126 Idaho 564, 567, 887 P.2d 1071, 1074 (1995)). Although this
Court typically applies a three-part test to determine whether a district court abused its
discretion, Wenke only challenges whether the district court “acted . . . consistently with
the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and . . . whether it
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Id. at 780, 419 P.3d at 1078 (quoting State
v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217, 221 (2008)).
C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Allowed The State To
Present Officer Mattson’s Bodycam Video To The Jury
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the prosecutor to play

Officer Mattson’s bodycam video of his conversation with Wenke. The Idaho Rules of
Evidence allow a district court to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” I.R.E. 403. Wenke claims
that, in applying I.R.E. 403 to the bodycam video, the district court “did not act consistently
with the legal standards applicable to the choice before it, and it did not reach its decision
. . . through an exercise of reason.” (Appellant’s brief, p.12.) He is wrong.
1.

The District Court Acted Consistently With Rule 403 When It Admitted
Officer Mattson’s Bodycam Video

The district court applied the correct legal standard in deciding whether the
prosecutor could play the bodycam video to the jury. Under I.R.E. 403, “‘[w]here allegedly
inflammatory evidence is relevant and material as to an issue of fact, the trial court must
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determine whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.’” Hall, 163 Idaho at 781, 419 P.3d at 1079 (quoting State v. Winn, 121 Idaho
850, 853, 828 P.2d 879, 882 (1992)). The district court made clear, albeit in the context of
a different piece of evidence, that it correctly understood how I.R.E. 403 works. (Tr., p.8,
Ls.14-18 (explaining that, under I.R.E. 403, “the trial court must engage in a balancing . . .
to determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative
value of the evidence”). After watching the bodycam video and considering Wenke’s
objection that his profanity in the video made the video unfairly prejudicial, the district
court conducted the necessary balancing it had correctly articulated earlier that morning
and stated its findings on the record: “I find that it’s relevant, and I don’t find that it is
unfairly prejudicial, so I will allow the State to use [the video].” (Tr., p.149, Ls.2-4.)
Citing State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 248 P.3d 720 (2010), Wenke erroneously
argues that the district court abused its discretion because it did not detail its balancing on
the record. (Appellant’s brief, p.11.) Ruiz does not lead to the result that Wenke seeks. In
Ruiz, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that, “[t]o exclude evidence under Rule 403, the
trial court must address whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by one of
the considerations listed in the Rule.” 150 Idaho at 471, 248 P.3d at 722. The court found
an abuse of discretion because “[t]he district court here did not conduct that analysis[;] [i]t
merely said, ‘You can’t talk about minimum mandatories.’” -Id.; --see ---------State v. Parker, 157
Idaho 132, 138-40, 334 P.3d 806, 812-14 (2014) (applying Ruiz to hold that the district
court, who thought “balancing of 403 . . . [was] not an issue here,” abused its discretion
because it “fail[ed] to conduct the Rule 403 balancing test”). Unlike in Ruiz, where nothing
in the record suggested the district court conducted the requisite balancing, and in Parker,
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where the district court affirmatively stated Rule 403 balancing did not apply, here the
district court correctly articulated how to conduct the Rule 403 balancing and expressly
stated its findings as to the bodycam video on the record. (Tr., p.8, Ls.14-18, p.149, Ls.24.) Idaho’s appellate courts have never required anything more.
Furthermore, no court has interpreted Ruiz as a requirement that district courts must
detail their Rule 403 balancing on the record. On the contrary, in an unpublished decision,
the Idaho Court of Appeals interpreted Ruiz to stand only for the proposition that the
appellate court must be able to infer from the record that the district court conducted the
Rule 403 balancing test, see State v. Ruggiero, No. 43726, 2017 WL 1162197, at *5 (Idaho
Ct. App. March 29, 2017) (unpublished) (holding, under Ruiz, the district court did not
abuse its discretion when applying Rule 403 because it “implicitly engaged in the I.R.E.
403 balancing”), which is consistent with the long-held view of Idaho’s appellate courts
that implicit findings and rationales can support a district court’s order, see State v.
Matthews, ___ Idaho ___, ___, 434 P.3d 209, 213-14 (2019) (holding “the district court
did not abuse its discretion . . . despite articulating a rationale inconsistent with relevant
legal authority” because the appellate court could infer from the “context” that the district
court also relied on a proper, unarticulated rationale); State v. Floyd, 159 Idaho 370, 372,
360 P.3d 379, 381 (Ct. App. 2015) (“[W]e should examine the record to determine implicit
findings which would support the trial court’s order.”). Given the district court’s correct
articulation of how to balance the probative value of evidence against its unfairly
prejudicial effect under Rule 403 and its express findings as to the bodycam video, the
record here dispositively demonstrates that the district court conducted a proper Rule 403
analysis before admitting the bodycam video. (Tr., p.8, Ls.14-18, p.149, Ls.2-4.)
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Wenke takes issue with the district court finding the bodycam video “relevant”
instead of assigning a “probative value.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-12 (emphasis in
original).) But the district court did not need to assign a probative value to properly conduct
Rule 403 balancing because it expressly found that the bodycam video was not unfairly
prejudicial. (Tr., p.149, Ls.2-4 (“I don’t find that it is unfairly prejudicial.”).) Because the
bodycam video was not unfairly prejudicial, its probative value—no matter how low—
could not possibly have been “substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair
prejudice.” I.R.E. 403. The district court’s finding that the bodycam video was relevant
(i.e., it had at least some probative value 4) was thus sufficient to comply with Rule 403.
2.

Wenke’s Arguments That The District Court Did Not Reach Its Decision
Through An Exercise Of Reason Are Not Properly Before This Court

Wenke’s arguments as to whether the district court reached its decision through an
exercise of reason are not properly before this Court on appeal. To preserve an evidentiary
objection a party must “timely object[] . . . and . . . state[] the specific ground” on which
the objection rests. I.R.E. 103(a)(1) (emphasis added). “Objecting to the admission of
evidence on one basis does not preserve a separate and different basis for exclusion of the
evidence.” State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 880, 11 P.3d 494, 499 (Ct. App. 2000). Indeed,
under general principles of appellate review, “both the issue and the party’s position on
the issue must be raised before the trial court for it to be properly preserved for appeal.”
State v. Gonzalez, No. 44534, slip op. at 6 (Idaho Feb. 20, 2019) (emphasis added).

4

Compare I.R.E. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more
or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence
in determining the action.”), with Probative, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)
(“Tending to prove or disprove.”).
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In the district court, Wenke objected to part of the bodycam video because “Wenke
g[ot] upset with Mattson regarding him being arrested and goes off essentially swearing at
him” and, “if that’s introduced, that’s doing nothing but essentially showing that Mr.
Wenke is a bad guy, convict him.” (1/22/2018 Tr., p.37, Ls.1-12.) In overruling Wenke’s
objection, the district court made clear that it was specifically addressing the position
Wenke had taken: “Mr. Schiller, I know your position. And I find that [the bodycam video
is] relevant, and I don’t find that it is unfairly prejudicial, so I will allow the State to use
that CD.” (Tr., p.149, Ls.2-4 (emphasis added).)
On appeal, however, Wenke has abandoned that position. His opening brief asserts
no argument and provides no authority to show that Wenke’s use of profanity made the
bodycam video unfairly prejudicial. (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-13.) He has thus waived that
argument. 5 See Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 857, 866, 292 P.3d 248, 257 (2012) (“‘We
will not consider assignments of error not supported by argument and authority in the
opening brief.’”) (quoting Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097
(2006)). Instead, Wenke raises on appeal three new arguments that he never asserted in

5

Wenke’s waived argument was, in any event, meritless. See State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho
569, 575, 388 P.3d 583, 589 (2017) (holding district court did not abuse its discretion when
it overruled the defendant’s objection to audio because of “his frequent use of profanity”);
see
also -United
- - --- - - - States
- - - - -v.- Pirani,
- - - - 406 F.3d 543, 555 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he profanities did
not create a risk of unfair prejudice that substantially outweighed the tape’s probative
value.”) (emphasis in original); United States v. Meling, 47 F.3d 1546, 1557 (9th Cir. 1995)
(finding use of profanity in audio tape not a “real concern” under Rule 403); People v.
Hines, 938 P.2d 388, 421 (Cal. 1997) (“[T]he trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it found that any prejudicial effect arising from the jury’s listening to defendant’s profanityladen remarks on the tape did not outweigh the conversation’s probative value.”); cf. State
v. Overton, 596 So. 2d 1344, 1356 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (“A defendant should not be able
to ‘clean up’ his confession or complain of added prejudice because he voluntarily
interjects profanity into his confession if the confession is otherwise admissible under the
law and the constitution.”).
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the district court. (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-13.) These arguments are not properly preserved
for appeal because Wenke did not take any of these positions in the district court. See
Gonzalez, No. 44534, slip op. at 6. In fact, when the district court asked Wenke whether
he had any objection to the bodycam video other than his objection regarding the
profanities, Wenke’s counsel affirmatively responded, “No, Your Honor.” (Tr., p.232,
Ls.3-4.) All three arguments are also meritless.
First, Wenke argues for the first time on appeal that the portion of the video in
which Officer Mattson states that he found over a pound of marijuana and that Wenke
would be charged with trafficking is not relevant because the police found less than half of
a pound of marijuana and Wenke was never charged with trafficking. (Appellant’s brief,
p.12.) That argument is not properly preserved because Wenke did not take that position
in the district court. See Gonzalez, No. 44534, slip op. at 6. As part of his objection,
Wenke’s counsel stated that “it sounds like the only thing the State wants is just a statement
that’s made by Mr. Wenke [at the end of the video].” (1/22/2018 Tr., p.37, Ls.8-12.) The
prosecutor clarified that he wanted to introduce the entire video, including the discussion
regarding the amount of marijuana found in the house. (1/22/2018 Tr., p.37, L.13 – p.40,
L.14.) After hearing the prosecutor wanted to introduce that discussion, Wenke’s counsel
made no objection as to its relevance. (See 1/22/2018 Tr., p.40, L.15 – p.41, L.25.)
Wenke’s objection that his use of profanity made the video unfairly prejudicial did not
preserve his appellate argument that the video is not relevant. See, e.g., State v. Rocha,
157 Idaho 246, 251, 335 P.3d 586, 591 (Ct. App. 2014) (“An objection on the ground of
relevance, without more, is insufficient to preserve an objection that the evidence should
have been excluded under I.R.E. 403.”); accord State v. Frandsen, No. 40270, 2014 WL
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1168884, at *2 (Idaho Ct. App. March 21, 2014) (unpublished) (holding Rule 403 objection
did not preserve relevancy objection).
Wenke’s relevancy argument is also meritless. Evidence is relevant when “the fact
finder may infer” that the evidence implicates the defendant. See Rocha, 157 Idaho at 251,
335 P.3d at 591 (emphasis added); see I.R.E. 401. When Officer Mattson told Wenke that
he had found “over a pound” of marijuana, Wenke incredulously responded: “Over a
pound? Shut the fu--.” (State’s Ex. 8 at 0:23-55.) Since the weight of the marijuana was,
in fact, only six ounces, Wenke’s incredulity at the marijuana weighing over a pound
implied that Wenke knew the actual weight of the marijuana and thus implicated him in
the possession of the marijuana. Wenke’s argument that he “responded with ‘incredulity’
because he was surprised to learn that any amount of marijuana was discovered”
(Appellant’s brief, p.12) ignores the fact that Wenke expressed incredulity specifically as
to the weight—not the presence—of the marijuana: “Over a pound? Shut the fu--.” (State’s
Ex. 8 at 0:44-55 (emphasis added).) Because a reasonable juror could infer from Wenke’s
incredulity that he knew the weight of the marijuana, his responses to Officer Mattson’s
statements that the marijuana weighed over a pound and, as a result, Wenke would be
charged with trafficking were relevant to the prosecutor’s theory that Wenke possessed the
marijuana with the intent to distribute it.6

6

Elsewhere in his brief, Wenke makes a meritless drive-by argument that the prosecutor
improperly referred to a fact not in evidence when he said in closing, with respect to
Wenke’s response to Officer Mattson: “‘maybe the next statement maybe he wanted to
make was, no, it was six ounces.’” (Appellant’s brief, p.26 (quoting Tr., p.476, Ls.4-6).)
The prosecutor is free to argue inferences from the evidence presented. State v. Sheahan,
139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003). Furthermore, Wenke did not object to that
statement at trial and has not even attempted to carry his fundamental-error burden with
respect to that statement on appeal. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226-27, 245 P.3d
961, 978-79 (2010).
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Second, Wenke argues for the first time on appeal that Officer Mattson’s statements
caused unfair prejudice because they were misleading. (Appellant’s brief, pp.12-13.)
Wenke’s counsel did not preserve this argument for appeal because he said nothing about
Officer’s Mattson’s statements in the district court; instead, he objected only to Wenke’s
use of profanities. (1/22/2018 Tr., p.37, Ls.1-12); see Gonzalez, No. 44534, slip op. at 6.
This argument is also meritless. As relevant here, Rule 403 only permits the
exclusion of evidence if there is a danger that the evidence is actually “misleading [to] the
jury.” I.R.E. 403. As presented at trial, the video could not have misled the jury or “ma[d]e
the jury think that more evidence was originally discovered that was, for some reason, not
disclosed to them.” (Appellant’s brief, p.13.)
The jury knew the actual weight of the marijuana because, before the prosecutor
played the bodycam video, Officer Mattson testified that he had weighed the marijuana
and that it weighed “6.61 ounces.” (Tr., p.226, Ls.3-5.) And, immediately after the jury
saw the video, Officer Mattson explained that his incorrect “over a pound” statement in the
video was based on “[t]he original estimate, just when [he] held the bowl full of marijuana,”
which is the information he had available to him at the time the video was recorded. (Tr.,
p.232, Ls.17-23; see 1/22/2018 Tr., p.37, L.17 – p.38, L.3.)
The jury also knew that Wenke had been charged with possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver, not trafficking. The district court repeatedly instructed the
jury that possession with the intent to deliver was the charge at issue. (E.g., Tr., p.21,
Ls.17-23, p.156, L.2 – p.157, L.9.) And the jury could infer that Officer Mattson’s
statement in the video that Wenke would be charged with trafficking was based on the
incorrect estimate that the marijuana weighed over a pound. (See Tr., p.232, Ls.17-23.)
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Given Officer Mattson’s explanation of his “over a pound” statement in the video, Officer
Mattson’s testimony that the marijuana actually weighed 6.61 ounces, and the district
court’s instructions as to the charge at issue, Officer Mattson’s statements in the video were
not misleading because no reasonable juror could have believed that the police had actually
found over a pound of marijuana in the house or that Wenke had been charged with
trafficking marijuana. 7
Third, Wenke argues for the first time on appeal that “[t]he video was unfairly
prejudicial because it showed [him] behind bars.” (Appellant’s brief, p.13.) Wenke failed
to preserve this argument because he did not argue in the district court that the visual of
Wenke in the jail caused unfair prejudice. See Gonzalez, No. 44534, slip op. at 6. In fact,
this new appellate argument is inconsistent with the objection Wenke made in the district
court that the prosecutor should “further redact that video” down to the last few seconds.
(1/22/2018 Tr., p.37, Ls.1-12.) Even if the district court had sustained Wenke’s objection
and admitted only the last few seconds of the video, the jury still would have seen Wenke
in the jail behind the metal door. (See State’s Ex. 8 at 2:18-2:26.) Because Wenke did not
make this argument in the district court—and, in fact, took a contrary position—it is not
properly before this Court on appeal. See Gonzalez, No. 44534, slip op. at 6.

7

In addition to being wrong, Wenke’s argument that the jury could have incorrectly
inferred from Officer Mattson’s statements in the video “that more evidence was originally
discovered that was, for some reason, not disclosed to them” is barred by his counsel’s
failure to dispel that incorrect inference through cross-examination. See State v. Fordyce,
151 Idaho 868, 870, 264 P.3d 975, 977 (Ct. App. 2011) (“An accused may not construct
unfair prejudice merely by conceiving of an incorrect inference that possibly could be
drawn from the State’s evidence and then declining to dispel that incorrect inference
through appropriate cross-examination.”).
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Wenke’s argument that showing the jury a video of him in the jail was the same as
putting him in front of the jury in restraints is also meritless. 8 The use of visible restraints
at trial “undermines the presumption of innocence” because “[i]t suggests to the jury that
the justice system itself sees a need to separate a defendant from the community at large.”
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 630 (2005) (internal quotations omitted). Here, however,
the jury heard multiple times, without objection, that the police took Wenke and the other
adults in the home to the jail only so they had somewhere warmer than outside of the house
to stay while the police obtained and executed the search warrant.
As the prosecutor explained during his opening statement:
And so you’ll learn that eventually these individuals were, because a search
warrant can take time, it can take a couple hours, a couple to several hours
to get, that they took these individuals that had been detained and they took
them to jail to get them out of the cold, get them out of cuffs, get them so
they could walk around and be free, kind of move freely in there.
(Tr., p.171, Ls.12-18.) Similarly, Officer Mattson testified that the police had to secure the
premises and create a perimeter while they waited for a search warrant and that Wenke and
the other adults were taken to the jail as part of that procedure. (Tr., p.196, L.15 – p.197,
L.3, p.230, L.19 – p.231, L.2, p.236, Ls.14-17.) Both Hickman and Witte also confirmed
that the adults who were in the house were detained in the jail pending execution of the
search warrant, and Hickman testified that they were moved to the jail because of the cold.
(Tr., p.333, Ls.1-6, p.334, L.17 – p.335, L.1, p.382, Ls.8-11.) Accordingly, unlike putting
a defendant in visible restraints in front of the jury at trial, the video of Wenke in the jail
did not “suggest[] to the jury that the justice system itself [saw] a need to separate [Wenke]
from the community at large,” Deck, 544 U.S. at 630, because the jury was expressly told

8

In the video, Wenke is not in jail garb or in physical restraints. (See State’s Ex. 8.)
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Wenke and the other adults had been detained in the jail only because the police did not
want to detain them outside in the cold pending the execution of the search warrant.
Even if Wenke had properly preserved this argument and the district court had erred
by admitting the video, the error would have been harmless. The improper admission of
evidence is harmless where the improperly admitted evidence is cumulative of evidence
admitted without an objection. See Pacheco v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 116 Idaho 794,
798, 780 P.2d 116, 120 (1989); State v. Woodbury, 127 Idaho 757, 761, 905 P.2d 1066,
1070 (Ct. App. 1995). The visual of Wenke in the jail could not have contributed to the
verdict obtained because, as explained above, the jury heard multiple times, without
objection, that the police had detained Wenke, Hickman, and Witte in the jail pending
execution of the search warrant. Put simply, the visual of Wenke in the jail did not convey
anything to the jury that it did not already know and thus could not have contributed to the
verdict. Any error in admitting the video on the basis that it showed Wenke in the jail was
thus harmless. 9
II.
The District Court Did Not Clearly Err When It Found Sufficient Evidence To Establish
That Wenke Divided Up And Weighed Marijuana In The Past
A.

Introduction
The district court properly admitted Hickman’s testimony that she had seen Wenke

divide up and weigh marijuana in the past as evidence of intent under Rule 404(b). On
appeal, Wenke challenges only the first step of the district court’s analysis, arguing that the

9

Wenke’s failure to argue fundamental error with respect to any of these three new
appellate arguments means he has both waived the arguments and failed to carry his
fundamental-error burden. See Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 857, 866, 292 P.3d 248, 257
(2012); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226-27, 245 P.3d 961, 978-79 (2010).
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district court could not have found sufficient evidence to establish Wenke’s prior bad acts
as fact because the district court found Hickman not credible. That is a misreading of the
record. The district court found only a specific portion of Hickman’s testimony regarding
the actual sale and delivery of marijuana not credible and properly excluded the admission
of 404(b) evidence based on that testimony. In contrast, the district court found, at least
implicitly, Hickman’s testimony regarding Wenke dividing up and weighing marijuana
sufficiently credible to establish those prior bad acts as fact under Rule 404(b). That
decision was not clearly erroneous.
B.

Standard Of Review
Typically, Idaho appellate courts apply an abuse of discretion standard to the

decision to admit or exclude evidence. See, e.g., State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228, 178
P.3d 28, 31 (2008). Here, however, Wenke challenges only the district court’s factual
determination that sufficient evidence established Wenke had divided up and weighed
marijuana in the past. (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-18.) This Court “treat[s] the trial court’s
factual determination that a prior bad act has been established by sufficient evidence as we
do all factual findings by a trial court.” State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 214, 207 P.3d 186,
190 (Ct. App. 2009). This Court “defer[s] to a trial court’s factual findings if supported by
substantial and competent evidence in the record.” Id.
C.

The Prosecutor Presented Sufficient Evidence To Show Wenke Had Divided Up
And Weighed Marijuana In The Past
The district court properly admitted Hickman’s testimony that she had seen Wenke

divide up and weigh marijuana in the past. Rule 404(b) permits the admission of evidence
of a crime, wrong, or other act for the purpose of proving intent. I.R.E. 404(b)(2). Prior
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to admitting evidence of prior bad acts, the district court must engage in a two-tiered
analysis. See Parmer, 147 Idaho at 214, 207 P.3d at 190. “The first tier involves a twopart inquiry: (1) whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the prior bad acts as fact;
and (2) whether the prior bad acts are relevant to a material disputed issue concerning the
crime charged, other than propensity.” Id. On appeal, Wenke challenges only the first
inquiry: the district court’s finding that sufficient evidence established the prior bad act as
fact. (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-18.)
The district court did not clearly err when it found sufficient evidence to establish
that Wenke had divided up and weighed marijuana in the past. In “mak[ing] the requisite
initial finding that a prior bad act is established as fact,” the district court may rely on an
“offer of proof . . . affidavits, stipulations by the parties, live testimony, or may hold more
extensive evidentiary hearings for each witness in advance of trial.” Parmer, 147 Idaho at
215, 207 P.3d at 191. The trial court need only “determine that there is sufficient evidence
to support a reasonable conclusion that the act occurred and that the defendant was the
actor.” Id.
Here, the district court followed the proper Rule 404(b) procedure. At a pre-trial
conference, the prosecutor explained that Hickman could provide eye-witness testimony to
as to two prior bad acts: (1) Hickman saw Wenke deliver marijuana and (2) Hickman saw
Wenke divide up and weigh marijuana. (1/22/2018 Tr., p.13, L.23 – p.14, L.23.) Although
the district court could have made its factual findings based on the prosecutor’s statements,
it decided to first hear Hickman’s testimony outside of the presence of the jury. (Tr., p.8,
L.7 – p.9, L.10).
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Hickman testified at the hearing consistent with the state’s offer of proof. She
testified that she had seen Wenke deliver marijuana on two different occasions. (Tr., p.297,
Ls.8-15.) She also testified that she had seen Wenke divide up and weigh marijuana on
two different occasions. (Tr., p.301, L.15 – p.302, L.25.) On cross-examination, Wenke’s
counsel elicited from Hickman that she had given inconsistent answers at the preliminary
hearing with respect to seeing Wenke deliver marijuana. (Tr., p.304, L.10 – p.307, L.10.)
Hickman responded that she had not told the truth at the preliminary hearing regarding
Wenke delivering marijuana because she was scared of the individuals to whom Wenke
delivered the marijuana. (Tr., p.304, L.24 – p.305, L.6.)
After hearing Hickman’s testimony, the district made its factual findings. (Tr.,
p.312, L.8 – p.313, L.20.) The district court stated: “I don’t find her testimony to be
credible regarding any prior incidents of delivery or distribution.” (Tr., p.312, Ls.8-14.
(emphasis added).) The district court pointed out that her testimony with respect to the
delivery and distribution was “completely different” than her testimony from the
preliminary hearing. (Tr., p.312, Ls.15-23.) Accordingly, the district court did “not allow
evidence of the prior incidents in terms of delivery or distribution of marijuana.” (Tr.,
p.312, L.24 – p.313, L.1.)
But, with respect to Wenke dividing up and weighing the marijuana, the district
court allowed the testimony after, at least implicitly, finding Hickman’s testimony on that
issue credible: “I will allow you to talk about she also said that she has seen him with
marijuana, she has seen him divide that marijuana up before. I’ll allow you to get into that
. . . .” (Tr., p.313, Ls.2-5.) Hickman’s eye-witness testimony thus constituted sufficient
evidence to establish Wenke’s past acts of dividing up and weighing marijuana as fact.

23

Wenke erroneously argues that the district court could not use Hickman’s testimony
to establish any prior bad act as fact because the district court “did not find her credible.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.17.)

That reads too much into the district court’s credibility

determination. The district court specified which part of Hickman’s testimony it did not
find credible: “I don’t find her testimony to be credible regarding any prior incidents of
delivery or distribution.” (Tr., p.312, Ls.12-14 (emphasis added).) And the district court
explained why that specific part of Hickman’s testimony was not credible:
Her testimony is contradictory to Ms. Witte’s in terms of picking up,
dropping off the defendant, which bag he had when they picked him up.
She did testify completely different in terms of whether she had ever
witnessed him giving people any marijuana in Idaho. She said no at the
preliminary hearing. And her testimony today doesn’t convince me that that
is accurate.
(Tr., p.312, Ls.16-23.)
The district court’s rationale does not apply to Hickman’s testimony that she saw
Wenke divide up and weigh marijuana. As Wenke concedes, “Hickman was not asked
whether she had seen Mr. Wenke divide up and weigh marijuana in Idaho at the preliminary
hearing.” 10 (Appellant’s brief, p.17.) This means, unlike Hickman’s testimony regarding
the actual delivery and distribution of marijuana, Hickman’s testimony that she had seen
Wenke divide up and weigh marijuana could not have contradicted her preliminary hearing

10

Wenke goes on to speculate that, “if [Hickman] was asked [at the preliminary hearing],
she would have said no because she testified there that she had never seen Mr. Wenke give
or sell marijuana to anyone in Idaho.” (Appellant’s pp.18-19 (emphases added).) Wenke’s
reasoning is flawed given the difference between seeing someone divide up and weigh
marijuana and seeing someone actually give away or sell marijuana. More to the point,
Wenke’s speculation that Hickman would have given an answer at the preliminary hearing
that contradicted her trial testimony is not a sufficient basis to find her testimony not
credible. See, e.g., Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 813, 907 P.2d 783, 790 (1995)
(explaining credibility determinations must be “supported by substantial and competent
evidence in the record”).
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testimony. Thus, the record shows that the district court’s lack-of-credibility determination
applied only to Hickman’s testimony regarding the actual sale and distribution of marijuana
because the district court expressly limited its lack-of-credibility determination to that part
of Hickman’s testimony and the underlying rationale for that finding did not apply to
Hickman’s testimony that she saw Wenke weigh and divide up marijuana.
Wenke’s reliance on the district court’s subsequent statement regarding Hickman’s
credibility is misplaced. (Appellant’s brief, pp.17-18.) After the district court made its
findings, the prosecutor argued that the district court had applied the wrong standard in
making its lack-of-credibility determination with respect to Hickman’s testimony
regarding the actual delivery and sale of marijuana. (See
- - Tr., p.313, Ls.14-16 (“Isn’t the
standard, though, for this portion of it, whether a reasonable juror could determine that?”).)
The district court rejected the prosecutor’s argument and reaffirmed its lack-of-credibility
determination: “I have to determine whether there’s sufficient evidence. And part of that
is credibility. And I don’t find her to be credible. I don’t find her testimony to be credible.”
(Tr., p.313, Ls.17-20.) Read in context—that is, in the context of the prosecutor asking the
district court to revisit its lack-of-credibility determination as to Hickman’s testimony
regarding the actual sale and distribution of marijuana—the district court’s statements can
only be read to refer back to its specific lack-of-credibility determination and not as a new
finding, without explanation, that none of Hickman’s testimony was credible. Because the
district court, at least implicitly, found credible Hickman’s testimony regarding Wenke
dividing up and weighing marijuana, the district court did not clearly err when it found
sufficient evidence to establish those other acts by Wenke as fact.
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In any event, any error in the admission of Hickman’s testimony was harmless.
“Where the issue is the admission of improper evidence, such admission will be considered
harmless if there is other competent evidence to the same effect upon which a jury could
reach the same result.” Pacheco, 116 Idaho at 798, 780 P.2d at 120. The prosecutor
introduced Hickman’s testimony that she had seen Wenke divide up and weigh marijuana
in the past to show that Wenke had the requisite intent to deliver on October 15. (1/22/2018
Tr., p.14, Ls.19-23; Tr., p.466, Ls.3-16.) Indeed, the district court instructed the jury that
it could only consider the evidence for a few limited purposes, including intent (Tr., p.456,
Ls.2-11), and this Court presumes the jury followed that instruction, see State v. Johnson,
163 Idaho 412, 422, 414 P.3d 234, 244 (2018).
Even setting aside Hickman’s testimony, however, the undisputed evidence showed
Wenke had the intent to distribute. Specifically, Officer Mattson testified, based on his
training and experience, that 6.61 ounces of marijuana is a significant amount of marijuana,
is inconsistent with personal use, and evidences the individual’s intent to traffic marijuana.
(Tr., p.226, Ls.6-11, p.255, Ls.14-19.) And Witte testified that, in the two-week span prior
to October 15, she overheard Hickman and Wenke talking about marijuana as a “way[] to
make money.” (Tr., p.390, L.14 – p.391, L.9.) Because Hickman’s testimony was only
introduced to show intent and the jury could use Officer Mattson’s testimony and Witte’s
testimony “to the same effect,” any error in the admission of Hickman’s testimony was
harmless. Pacheco, 116 Idaho at 798, 780 P.2d at 120.
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III.
The Prosecutor Did Not Commit Prosecutorial Misconduct That Rose To The Level Of
Fundamental Error
A.

Introduction
The prosecutor did not commit misconduct in his closing argument that rose to the

level of fundamental error. Wenke has failed to carry his burden on any of Perry’s three
prongs as to each alleged error: First, none of the alleged errors rose to the level of a
constitutional violation because none of the alleged errors violated Wenke’s due process
right to a fair trial. Second, none of the alleged errors plainly exist in the record because
Wenke has failed to point to any evidence in the record showing that his counsel’s omitted
objections were not tactical decisions. Third, Wenke has failed to show that any of the
alleged errors were not harmless given the district court’s proper instructions to the jury.
B.

Standard Of Review
Where, as here, an “alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous

objection, it shall only be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho’s fundamental error
doctrine.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
C.

Wenke Has Failed To Show That The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct That
Rose To The Level Of Fundamental Error
The prosecutor did not commit prosecutorial misconduct amounting to fundamental

error in his closing argument. “Both sides have traditionally been afforded considerable
latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss fully, from their
respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom.” State v.
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003). “[I]n reviewing allegations of
prosecutorial misconduct, this Court ‘must keep in mind the realities of trial.’” State v.
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Alwin, 164 Idaho 160, ___, 426 P.3d 1260, 1269 (2018) (quoting State v. Field, 144 Idaho
559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007)). Closing arguments “are seldom carefully constructed
in toto before the event; improvisation frequently results in syntax left imperfect and
meaning less than crystal clear.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974).
“[A] court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have
its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw
that meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations.” Id. “A fair trial is not
necessarily a perfect trial.” Alwin, 164 Idaho at ___, 426 P.3d at 1269.
“Where prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to at trial, Idaho appellate courts
may only order a reversal when the defendant demonstrates that the violation in question
qualifies as fundamental error . . . .” Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979. Fundamental
error “review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the defendant bears the burden of
persuading the appellate court that the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the
defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists . . .; and (3) was not
harmless.” Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Wenke cannot satisfy his burden on any prong with
respect to any of the alleged errors.
1.

The Prosecutor Did Not Diminish The Reasonable Doubt Burden

Wenke has failed to show the prosecutor committed fundamental error in his
closing argument when he described “what constitutes reasonable doubt” as “vague,”
“subjective,” and “shifting.” (Tr., p.489, Ls.9-13.) First, Wenke has not shown that the
prosecutor’s descriptions violated an unwaived constitutional right. “Misconduct may
occur during closing argument if a prosecutor diminishes or distorts the State’s burden to
prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Rocha, 157 Idaho at 252, 335
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P.3d at 592. Here, however, the prosecutor did not diminish or distort the state’s burden.
While perhaps inartful, the prosecutor’s use of the word “vague” to describe what
constitutes reasonable doubt was not necessarily incorrect. Compare Victor v. Nebraska,
511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (“Although this standard is an ancient and honored aspect of our
criminal justice system, it defies easy explication.”), with Vague, Merriam-Webster
Online, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/vague (last accessed March 20,
2019) (defining vague as “not clearly expressed: stated in indefinite terms”).

The

prosecutor’s description of what constitutes reasonable doubt as “subjective” was, in fact,
correct. See, e.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 360 (1972) (describing the need for
a reasonable doubt instruction to “impress[] on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a
subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue” (emphasis added)); State v. Kuhn, 139
Idaho 710, 714, 85 P.3d 1109, 1113 (Ct. App. 2003) (explaining reasonable doubt “requires
each juror to come to a subjective state of near certitude” (emphasis added)).
In context, the prosecutor’s description of “what constitutes reasonable doubt” as
“shifting” implies simply that what constitutes reasonable doubt can “shift[]” or change
from one person to another—an emphasis on the subjective nature of the standard. See
Shift, Merriam-Webster Online, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/shift (last
visited March 20, 2019) (defining shift as “to change the place, position, or direction of”).
Immediately prior to the prosecutor’s use of the word “shifting,” he defined reasonable
doubt by reading the jury instruction, so he was not suggesting that the definition of
reasonable doubt changes. (Tr., p.488, L.16 – p.489, L.13.) Furthermore, the prosecutor
in no way implied to the jury that the burden itself “shift[s]” to the defendant because his
“shifting” description referred only to “what constitutes reasonable doubt.” (Tr., p.489,
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Ls.9-13); cf. State v. Herrera, 152 Idaho 24, 31, 266 P.3d 499, 506 (Ct. App. 2011) (finding
prosecutorial misconduct for suggesting the defendant had some burden).
Second, Wenke has failed to show that the alleged error plainly exists. Part of the
defendant’s burden on this prong of Perry is to show that the record “contain[s] evidence
as to whether or not trial counsel made a tactical decision in failing to object.” State v.
Miller, No. 46517, slip op. at 3 (Idaho March 15, 2019). “If the record does not contain
evidence regarding whether counsel’s decision was strategic, the claim is factual in nature
and thus more appropriately addressed via a petition for post-conviction relief.” Id.
“Appellate counsel’s opinion that the decision could not have been tactical does not satisfy
the second prong of Perry.” Id.
Wenke has failed to show that his counsel’s omitted objection was not tactical. He
points to no specific evidence in the record and instead offers only his appellate counsel’s
opinion that “it is readily apparent that defense counsel’s failure to object to the
prosecutor’s statement was not a tactical decision” and “there was no reasonable strategic
basis not to object to such misconduct other than ignorance of the law.” (Appellant’s brief,
p.21.) That is insufficient on its face. See Miller, No. 46517, slip op. at 3 (holding that
appellant counsel’s contentions that “it is clear from the record that the failure to object
was not tactical” and that “failing to object could not have benefitted the defendant” are
insufficient to show an error plainly exists). Furthermore, Wenke’s claim that “there was
no reasonable strategic basis not to object to such misconduct” is incorrect. (Appellant’s
brief, p.21.) As Wenke concedes, one possible interpretation of the prosecutor’s remarks
made it more difficult for the state to convict by “allow[ing] the jury to view any doubt as
reasonable.” (Appellant’s brief, p.21 (emphasis added).) Wenke’s counsel could have
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made the tactical decision to let the prosecutor proverbially shoot himself in the foot by
describing an increased standard of proof rather than object and correct the mistake.
Third, Wenke has failed to show that the alleged error was not harmless. “[T]he
third prong of Perry requires that the defendant demonstrate that the clear error in the
record . . . actually affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.” Miller, No. 46517, slip
op. at 4 (emphasis added). Here, nothing in the record suggests that the alleged error
actually affected the outcome of the trial—quite the opposite, in fact. The district court
properly instructed the jury on the definition of reasonable doubt (Tr., p.157, Ls.10-24),
and this Court “presume[s] that the jury followed the jury instructions,” State v. Carson,
151 Idaho 713, 718, 264 P.3d 54, 59 (2011) (finding any error in prosecutor’s remarks on
reasonable doubt standard harmless because district court properly instructed the jury); see
State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 369, 313 P.3d 1, 25 (2013) (finding any error in
prosecutor’s comment during voir dire questioning regarding the reasonable doubt standard
harmless because the district court properly instructed the jury). Moreover, the prosecutor
insisted that the jury follow—not deviate from—the district court’s instruction. (Tr., p.488,
L.16 – p.489, L.13). Because the record demonstrates any error in the prosecutor’s
description of what constitutes reasonable doubt was harmless, Wenke failed to carry his
burden on the third prong of Perry.
2.

The Prosecutor Did Not Vouch For The Credibility Of The Witnesses

Wenke has failed to show that the prosecutor committed fundamental error in his
closing argument by vouching for the credibility of the witnesses. First, Wenke has not
shown that the prosecutor’s statement that “[w]e have credible testimony” constituted
prosecutorial misconduct. (Tr., p.477, Ls.1-5.) “[I]n closing argument, the parties are
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entitled to explain how, from their own perspectives, the evidence confirms or calls into
doubt the credibility of particular witnesses.” State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 928, 354
P.3d 462, 490 (2015) (internal quotations omitted). Vouching only occurs “if there is no
evidence to support an assertion made by the prosecutor.” Alwin, 164 Idaho at ___, 426
P.3d at 1270.
Here, the prosecutor’s statement regarding witness credibility was not vouching
because it was based on the evidence. See id. at ___, 426 P.3d at 1270-71 (finding no
prosecutorial misconduct because “the prosecutor connected the credibility statement to
evidence in the record”); Ehrlick, 158 Idaho at 928, 354 P.3d at 490 (finding no
prosecutorial misconduct where “the prosecutor explained how the evidence illustrated that
Ehrlick was dishonest during the investigation and later at trial”). Shortly after the
prosecutor stated “[w]e have credible testimony, not only from Colbie Witte and Jennifer
Hickman, but also Officer Mattson” (Tr., p.477, Ls.1-5), he pointed to specific evidence
presented at trial from which the jury could infer that Witte, Hickman, and Officer Mattson
were, in fact, credible (Tr., p.481, L.1 – p.484, L.25). For example, the prosecutor
explained that Officer Mattson gave “uncontradicted testimony” and had no bias. (Tr.,
p.481, Ls.3-18.) For Hickman and Witte, the prosecutor pointed to their candor in talking
about their own criminal and drug-related problems, their agreement with the state to testify
truthfully, and the reasonable explanations for the inconsistencies in their testimony. (Tr.,
p.482, L.12 – p.484, L.25.) “Because the prosecutor did not make unsupported assertions
of [the witnesses’] credibility, the prosecutor’s statements did not constitute vouching.”
Alwin, 164 Idaho at ___, 426 P.3d at 1271.
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Second, Wenke has failed to point to any evidence in the record showing that the
alleged error plainly exists. See Miller, No. 46517, slip op. at 3 (holding second Perry
prong requires defendant to show that the record “contain[s] evidence as to whether or not
trial counsel made a tactical decision in failing to object.”). Appellate counsel’s bald
assertion that “there was no reasonable tactical or strategic reason not to object” is
insufficient. (Appellant’s brief, p.23); see Miller, No. 46517, slip op. at 3. Furthermore,
the record shows that Wenke’s counsel could have made the tactical decision to address
the prosecutor’s comment in his own closing argument rather than call attention to it by
objecting. As to Officer Mattson, Wenke’s counsel agreed that he was credible. (Tr.,
p.493, Ls.4-9.) As to both Hickman and Witte, Wenke’s counsel argued extensively that
internal inconsistences, criminal backgrounds, and inconsistencies with past testimony
given at the preliminary hearing meant neither Hickman nor Witte could be trusted. (Tr.,
p.496, L.6 – p.500, L.10.) His decision to rebut the prosecutor’s credibility argument rather
than object could have been a tactical decision. See Miller, No. 46517, slip op. at 10
(holding defense counsel’s decision to “rebut[] the prosecutor’s statement in closing
argument” meant failure to object could have been tactical).
Third, Wenke has failed to show the alleged error actually affected the trial. “This
Court has said misconduct can be remedied when the district court gives an instruction
‘informing the jury that the attorneys’ comments are not evidence.’” Miller, No. 46517,
slip op. at 9 (quoting Alwin, 164 Idaho at 169, 426 P.3d at 1269). Here, the district court
instructed the jurors, multiple times, that “[t]he arguments and statements of the attorneys
are not evidence” and that they must reach their decision based only on the evidence. (Tr.,
p.457, Ls.19-23; see Tr., p.155, Ls.20-21, p.158, Ls.9-17, p.451, Ls.5-10.) The district
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court also instructed the jury that it was the jury’s role (i.e., not the prosecutor’s role) “to
think about the testimony of each witness you heard and decide how much you believe of
what the witness had to say.” (Tr., p.160, L.2 – p.161, L.1.) “[T]his Court presumes the
jury followed the court’s jury instructions,” Miller, No. 46517, slip op. at 10, and Wenke
has not pointed to any indication in the record that the jury did not follow the instructions.
He has thus failed to show the alleged error actually affected the trial.
3.

The Prosecutor Did Not Commit Fundamental Error By Misstating The
Evidence

Wenke has failed to show that the prosecutor committed fundamental error in his
closing argument by misstating the evidence. First, Wenke has not shown that the
prosecutor’s misstatement of the evidence violated an unwaived constitutional right. “It is
generally recognized as improper for a prosecutor to make misstatements of the evidence
during argument.” State v. Tupis, 112 Idaho 767, 772, 735 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Ct. App.
1987). But such misstatements only violate a constitutional right when the “prosecutor’s
remark . . . by itself so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction
a denial of due process.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974).
The prosecutor’s misstatement here was sufficiently insignificant such that it could
not have so infected the trial with unfairness as to make Wenke’s conviction a denial of
due process. In his closing argument, the prosecutor argued to the jury that Wenke told
several lies in the bodycam video, which showed a consciousness of guilt. (Tr., p.475, L.8
– p.477, L.24.) He argued that one of the lies was Wenke’s statement that he did not have
his weights in the back bedroom where the marijuana had been found:
Again, he asked him, are my weights in the room? No. Again, that’s not
true. We have credible testimony, not only from Colbie Witte and Jennifer
Hickman, but also Officer Mattson that in the room that he was staying in,
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there were weights. And that he used those weights in that room. Sure.
There’s also testimony that he used them outside. None that he used them
outside on this day.
(Tr., p.476, L.24 – p.477, L.5 (paragraph breaks removed).)
The prosecutor’s assertion that the jury had not heard testimony that Wenke had
used the weights outside on October 15 was not correct because Witte testified that Wenke
had used the weights outside on that day. (Tr., p.394, Ls.12-20.) But that assertion played,
at best, second chair in the prosecutor’s argument that Wenke had lied. The prosecutor did
not argue that Wenke lied about where or when he used the weights; he argued Wenke lied
about whether his weights were physically present in the back bedroom on October 15 at
the time of the search. (Tr., p.476, L.24 – p.477, L.5.) As the prosecutor explained, the
jury could infer Wenke lied when he stated that his weights were not in the back bedroom
because witnesses had testified that there were weights in the back bedroom. (See Tr.,
p.208, Ls.6-11, p.354, Ls.24-25.) Witte’s testimony that Wenke used the weights outside
at some point on October 15 does not contradict Officer Mattson’s testimony that he found
weights in the back bedroom or make Wenke’s statement that his weights were not in the
back bedroom true. Because the prosecutor’s misstatement had relatively little to do with
the prosecutor’s argument or Wenke’s guilt, it could not have sufficiently infected the trial
with unfairness that it violated Wenke’s constitutional right to due process. See State v.
Alwin, 164 Idaho 160, ___, 426 P.3d 1260, 1269 (2018) (“A fair trial is not necessarily a
perfect trial.” (internal quotations omitted)).
Second, Wenke has failed to show that his counsel’s failure to object to the
misstatement was not a tactical decision. See Miller, No. 46517, slip op. at 3 (holding
second Perry prong requires defendant to show that the record “contain[s] evidence as to
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whether or not trial counsel made a tactical decision in failing to object.”). Appellate
counsel’s unsupported assertion that “there was no reasonable tactical or strategic reason
not to object” is insufficient. (Appellant’s brief, p.23); see Miller, No. 46517, slip op. at 3.
And the record suggests that Wenke’s counsel made the tactical decision to rebut the
prosecutor’s misstatement in his closing argument rather than object during the
prosecutor’s closing argument: Wenke’s counsel pointed out that the jury had heard
testimony that Wenke was lifting weights outside on October 15. (Tr., p.496, Ls.17-25.)
Wenke’s counsel’s decision to rebut the prosecutor’s argument rather than object means
the alleged error could not plainly exist. See Miller, No. 46517, slip op. at 10 (holding
defense counsel’s decision to “rebut[] the prosecutor’s [alleged mis]statement in closing
argument” meant the failure to object could have been a tactical decision).
Third, Wenke has failed to show that the alleged error actually affected the trial.
As explained above, the district court properly instructed the jury that “[t]he arguments and
statements of the attorneys are not evidence” (Tr., p.457, Ls.19-23), and “this Court
presumes the jury followed the court’s jury instructions,” Miller, No. 46517, slip op. at 10.
Because the district court properly instructed the jury, Wenke’s counsel corrected the
misstatement, and the misstatement was insignificant to the prosecutor’s argument, Wenke
has failed to show that the misstatement actually affected the trial.
4.

The Prosecutor’s Use Of The Pronouns “We” And “Us” Did Not Constitute
Fundamental Error

Wenke has failed to show that the prosecutor’s use of “we” and “us” in his closing
argument constituted fundamental error. First, Wenke has not shown that using those
pronouns violated an unwaived constitutional right. He cites no Idaho authority for the
proposition that prosecutor’s may not use “we” and “us” during closing argument and

36

instead relies on a decision from the Minnesota Supreme Court. (Appellant’s brief, p.24
(citing State v. Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d 776 (Minn. 2006)).)
Properly understood, Mayhorn does not support Wenke’s argument. In Mayhorn,
the state charged Mayhorn with aiding and abetting first-degree premeditated murder and
second-degree assault. 720 N.W.2d at 779. The state presented evidence that Mayhorn
had been involved “in the trafficking of drugs,” including evidence that the victim “was
murdered by Mayhorn because [the victim] was suspected of stealing drugs from him.” Id.
at 780. During the prosecutor’s closing argument, the prosecutor stated: “‘This is kind of
foreign for all of us, I believe, because we’re not really accustomed to this drug world and
drug dealing.’” Id. at 789. The Minnesota Supreme Court held this statement constituted
prosecutorial misconduct because the prosecutor “describe[d] herself and the jury as a
group of which the defendant [was] not a part” Id. at 790.
The Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently clarified its holding in Mayhorn. See
Nunn v. State, 753 N.W.2d 657, 662-63 (Minn. 2008). In Nunn, the prosecutor repeatedly
used the word “we” in his closing argument:
We learned in this case that he possesses and carries guns. We learned that
he threatened to hurt people if it involves his money or his drugs. We
learned that he was trying to intimidate his own cousin because it involved
his money and his drugs. We learned that he rode in Minneapolis with guns
in the car.
And we also learned that if he was wronged, if he felt wronged about what
was important to him, the money and the drugs, that he would kill for it.
That’s what we learned during the course of this trial. That was important
to him—the drugs and that money—and he would kill for it.
Id. at 662. Nunn argued that the prosecutor’s repeated use of the word “we” constituted
misconduct under Mayhorn. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed. Id. at 663. The
court explained that the problem in Mayhorn was that the prosecutor used a “description
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of the foreign drug world, of which the defendant was a part and the prosecutor was not,”
whereas in Nunn the prosecutor used “we” to “describ[e] the evidence that had been
presented at trial (i.e., ‘we learned’ various facts from the trial testimony).” Id. The
Minnesota Supreme Court found no problem with the Nunn prosecutor’s statements
“because the ‘we’ could reasonably be interpreted in this context to refer to everybody who
was in the court when the evidence was presented.” Id.
Here, the prosecutor’s use of the pronouns “us” and “we” did not constitute
prosecutorial misconduct because, like the prosecutor in Nunn, he used these pronouns to
refer to everybody who was in the court when the evidence was presented. (See, e.g., Tr.,
p.464, Ls.19-21 (“We know from the defendant’s wife, from testimony of Ms. Jennifer
Hickman and Colbie Witte that the defendant’s brother has a marijuana farm.”); Tr., p.473,
L.14 (“Continuing that, what else did we learn?”); Tr., p.482, Ls.7-9 (“And we know he
got back to Idaho. We know from Ms. Hickman and Ms. Witte . . . .”). Unlike the
prosecutor in Mayhorn, who used “we” and “us” to separate the defendant’s “drug world”
from the prosecutor and the jury, 720 N.W.2d at 789-80, the prosecutor here never used
“we” and “us” in a context that necessarily referred to the state and the jury but did not
include the defendant.
Although Wenke concedes that at least some of the prosecutor’s uses of “we” and
“us” were proper, he takes issue with the use of the pronouns when referring to an inference
that could be drawn from the evidence. (Appellant’s brief, p.25.) For example, when the
prosecutor stated, “It’s common sense that tells us that there was marijuana in that bag.”
(Tr., p.463, Ls.10-14.) But the “we” and “us” in those circumstances could just as readily
refer to “everybody who was in court when the evidence was presented,” Nunn, 753
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N.W.2d at 663, as the “we” and “us” used in the concededly benign circumstances. The
prosecutor never suggested, for example, that everyone in the courtroom except the
defendant had common sense or could draw inferences from the evidence. In fact, he made
it clear from the beginning of the trial that common sense is “something everyone has.”
(Tr., p.165, Ls.9-14; see Tr., p.165, L.15 (“And you know, we all have common sense.”).)
Furthermore, the prosecutor’s use of “we” and “us” when referring to inferences
that can be drawn from the evidence does not distinguish this case from Nunn. In Nunn,
at least some of the facts the prosecutor told the jury “we learned” could only have been
inferred from the evidence presented: “We learned that he was trying to intimidate his own
cousin because it involved his money and his drugs.” Id. at 662. “And we also learned
that if he was wronged, if he felt wronged about what was important to him, the money and
the drugs, that he would kill for it.” Id. Yet the court found no misconduct. Id. at 663.
Wenke also erroneously argues that the prosecutor’s use of pronouns was
problematic because the prosecutor used the same pronoun to refer to different groups of
people at different points in his closing argument. (Appellant’s brief, p.25.) That is, of
course, the nature of a pronoun—it can take on a different meaning depending on the
context.

See

Pronoun,

Merriam-Webster

Online,

https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/pronoun (last accessed March 20, 2019) (defining pronoun as “any
of a small set of words in a language that are used as substitutes for nouns or noun phrases
and whose referents are named or understood in the context”). More to the point, in the
examples Wenke has cited, context made the meaning of the pronoun clear. (Appellant’s
brief, pp.25-27.) For example, when the prosecutor said, “[w]e are going to re-file the
felonies” (Tr., p.482, L.12 – p.483, L.16), a reasonable person would have understood “we”
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to mean the state because no one else files charges. And when the prosecutor said, “What
does preparation tell us? It tells us he intended to do something with that marijuana” (Tr.,
p.479, Ls.7-9), a reasonable person would have understood “us” to mean everyone in the
courtroom because they all heard the evidence regarding “preparation.” Because the
prosecutor did not use the pronouns “us” and “we” in an effort to separate the state and the
jury from the defendant and the meanings of the pronouns were not confusing, the
prosecutor’s use of the pronouns did not violate an unwaived constitutional right.
Second, Wenke has failed to show that his counsel did not make a tactical decision
not to object. See State v. Miller, No. 46517, slip op. at 3 (holding second Perry prong
requires defendant to show that the record “contain[s] evidence as to whether or not trial
counsel made a tactical decision in failing to object.”). Wenke’s appellate counsel’s
opinion that “there is no reasonable strategic or tactical basis for the defense counsel not to
object” and that “there is nothing to be gained” from not objecting are insufficient. See id.
(rejecting those two opinions as insufficient). Moreover, the record suggests that Wenke’s
counsel made the tactical decision not to object to the prosecutor using “we” and “us”
because he too wanted to use those pronouns in closing argument. (See, e.g., Tr., p.495,
Ls.11-12 (“We had testimony here saying that James smoked marijuana, smelled
marijuana.”); Tr., p.500, Ls.5-6 (“You are not going to admit to a single thing, yet we are
supposed to find her credible? We are supposed to find her credible enough to find beyond
a reasonable doubt that James is guilty?”).)
Third, Wenke has failed to show that the alleged error actually affected the trial.
As explained above, the district court properly instructed the jury that “[t]he arguments and
statements of the attorneys are not evidence” (Tr., p.457, Ls.19-23), and “this Court
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presumes the jury followed the court’s jury instructions,” Miller, No. 46517, slip op. at 10.
Because the district court properly instructed the jury that the attorneys’ closing arguments
were not evidence, Wenke has failed to show that the prosecutor’s use of pronouns during
his closing argument actually affected the verdict.
IV.
Wenke Has Failed To Show That The Cumulative Error Doctrine Applies
Wenke has failed to show that the cumulative error doctrine applies to his case.
“The cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of which
by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial in
contravention of the defendant’s constitutional right to due process.” Sheahan, 139 Idaho
at 287, 77 P.3d at 976. “In order to find cumulative error, this Court must first conclude
that there is merit to more than one of the alleged errors and then conclude that these errors,
when aggregated, denied the defendant a fair trial.” Id. The cumulative error doctrine
cannot apply here because Wenke has not shown any errors. See id.
Even if Wenke had shown one or more errors, the error or errors would be harmless
given the overwhelming evidence presented against Wenke at trial.

See State v.

Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 46, 408 P.3d 38, 44 (2017) (holding error harmless “[b]ased
on the overwhelming evidence presented against [the defendant] at trial”); State v. Gamble,
146 Idaho 331, 345, 193 P.3d 878, 892 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding cumulative error doctrine
inapplicable where “there was overwhelming evidence” presented against the defendant).
It was undisputed that Wenke had access to the marijuana on his brother’s farm on October
15, 2017. Wenke’s wife testified, and Wenke did not dispute, that his brother owned a
marijuana farm in Ontario, Oregon. (Tr., p.358, Ls.16-22.) She also placed Wenke at the
marijuana farm on October 15, 2017. (Tr., p.361, Ls.1-3.)
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The prosecutor also presented undisputed evidence that the Oregon Ducks bag,
which the officers found on October 15 and had “a green, leafy plant substance throughout
the inside interior,” belonged to Wenke. (Tr., p.203, Ls.5-19.) Wenke’s wife testified that,
although it technically belonged to her, Wenke owned a black Oregon Ducks bag. (Tr.,
p.360, Ls.9-11.) Moreover, as Officer Mattson explained to the jury, in his interview with
Wenke and at the preliminary hearing, Officer Mattson accidentally referred to the black
bag as an “Oregon State bag.” (Tr., p.233, L.16 – p.234, L.11.) When he mistakenly
testified at the preliminary hearing that it was an Oregon State bag, as opposed to an Oregon
Ducks bag, Wenke “quacked,” which indicated Wenke was familiar with the bag. 11 (Tr.,
p.234, Ls.12-17.)
In addition to Wenke having access to a marijuana farm on the day of the search
and owning the bag that was lined with marijuana, he is the only person that officers saw
in the back bedroom shortly before recovering the 6.61 ounces of marijuana from the back
bedroom. Officer Mattson testified that, after Hickman lied to him about Wenke being in
her house at all, he saw Wenke come out of the back bedroom where the officers
subsequently found the 6.61 ounces of marijuana. (Tr., p.190, L.4 – p.191, L.7, p.221,
Ls.8-16, p.226, Ls.3-5.) And, as explained above, the jury could infer the intent to
distribute from the amount of marijuana based on Officer Mattson’s testimony that 6.61
ounces of marijuana is a significant amount of marijuana, is inconsistent with personal use,
and evidences the individual’s intent to traffic marijuana. (Tr., p.226, Ls.6-11, p.255,
Ls.14-19.) Not only did Wenke not contest Officer Mattson’s testimony, his counsel
affirmatively told the jury during closing argument that the police officers testified

11

Oregon State’s mascot is a beaver. (Tr., p.233, Ls.21-25.)
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credibly. (Tr., p.493, Ls.4-9 (“And I don’t think we have a lot to argue with regarding the
police officers that came in and testified. I think they were credible.”).)
All of this undisputed testimony, which was sufficient to convict Wenke by itself,
was also corroborated by testimony from Hickman and Witte that Wenke either did not
object to in the district court, did not challenge on appeal, or both. Witte testified that, on
October 15, she and Hickman gave Wenke a ride from the marijuana farm to Hickman’s
house and that Wenke had a half-full black bag with an Oregon Ducks logo on it. (Tr.,
p.371, Ls.3-5, p.373, Ls.3-9, p.376, Ls.7-10.) She also testified that, at some point during
the two weeks preceding October 15, she overheard Wenke and Hickman discuss
marijuana as an “idea[] of [a] way[] to make money.” (Tr., p.390, L.14 – p.391, L.9.)
Hickman testified that, on October 15, she and Witte gave Wenke a ride from the marijuana
farm to her house and that Wenke had a half-full black bag with an Oregon Ducks logo on
it. (Tr., p.320, Ls.10-24, p.321, Ls.21-25.) She also testified that she saw Wenke drying
out the marijuana in the oven immediately prior to the police officers’ arrival (Tr., p.325,
L.9 – p.326, L.13), that he took the marijuana into the back bedroom (Tr., p.326, Ls.1-5),
and that, after the adults in the home were placed in handcuffs and seated outside of the
house, Wenke told Hickman that he hid the marijuana in the closet in the back bedroom
(Tr., p.333, Ls.4-20), which is exactly where the officers found it (Tr., p.208, Ls.12-24).
Given the overwhelming evidence of Wenke’s guilt, any of the errors Wenke alleges on
appeal, either alone or together, were harmless.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment entered after a jury
found Wenke guilty of possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver.
DATED this 2nd day of April, 2019.

/s/ Jeff Nye
JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
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